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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 
Lori Good brought this action on behalf of her minor son, 
Robert Warren, seeking damages under Title IX for sexual 
abuse he received at the hands of his fourth grade teacher 
in a school that was part of the defendant school district. 
Plaintiff also contends that the school's principal was 
individually liable for damages under 42 U.S.C.S 1983. The 
jury returned a verdict against the school district under 
Title IX, but found the principal was not liable under 
S 1983. The district court refused to grant a renewed 
defense motion for judgment as a matter of law or grant a 
new trial, and awarded plaintiff attorney's fees. This appeal 
followed. For the reasons set forth below, we will reverse 
and remand for a new trial on plaintiff 's Title IX claim. 
 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
 
In April 1995, Robert Warren transferred into the 
Reading School District's Tenth and Green Elementary 
School where he was assigned to Harold Brown's fourth 
grade class. At some point after Robert's transfer, Robert 
remained after school at Brown's request. While Robert 
remained in the classroom, Brown locked the classroom 
door, and asked Robert to play a "game" that Brown called 
"shoulders." This consisted of Robert squatting with his 
 
                                2 
 
 
head between Brown's legs and placing his shoulders under 
Brown's thighs. Robert would then lift Brown's upper body 
from this squatting position as Brown leaned forward. As 
Robert lifted, Brown's genitals touched the back of Robert's 
head and neck. Brown challenged Robert to squat and lift 
as many times as he could and Brown "rewarded" Robert 
with candy or money when the "game" was over. Brown 
apparently repeated this routine two or three times per 
week during the school year. On at least one occasion 
during the following summer, Brown also drove by Robert's 
house in order to pick Robert up and take him to a"secret 
spot" near the woods where they again played"shoulders." 
 
In early November 1995, Lori Good discovered her son's 
journal and read an entry in which Robert described 
playing "shoulders" with Brown at a secret spot. Good 
immediately became concerned and spoke to Robert about 
the entry. After that discussion, Good reported Brown's 
conduct to the Berks County Children and Youth Services. 
That agency reported Brown's suspected abuse to the 
school district, and Brown was suspended, and ultimately 
resigned his position.1 
 
A short time later, Good initiated a civil rights action 
under 42 U.S.C. S 1983 seeking damages from the Reading 
School District, Dr. Sepulveda, the principal of Tenth and 
Green Street School; and Dr. James A. Goodhart, the 
former superintendent of the Reading School District. The 
suit included a state law claim against Sepulveda and 
Goodhart under 42 Pa. C.S.A. S 8550. Good subsequently 
amended the complaint to add a private cause of action for 
damages against the school district under the Education 
Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. S 1681 et. seq. (Title IX). 
 
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of 
the defendants and against Robert on all claims except the 
Title IX claim against the school district and theS 1983 
claim against Sepulveda. Those claims proceeded to trial. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The briefs of the parties confirm that Brown surrendered to authorities 
and was thereafter arrested on three criminal complaints detailing sexual 
abuse of several male students. He was thereafter prosecuted in the 
Court of Common Pleas of Berks County. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 
v. Harold Brown, Criminal Nos. 1677/96, 973/96, 2107/96. 
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Carlos Mercado testified at trial for the plaintiff. 
Mercado's son had been a student at Tenth and Green 
Elementary School in the early 1990s. Mercado testified 
that he went to that school sometime in 1992 or 1993 and 
spoke with Sepulveda regarding his concerns about Brown 
engaging in inappropriate activity with his son. The 
following exchange occurred during Mercado's testimony: 
 
       Q: And what did you say to the principal that day, 
       Mr. Mercado? 
 
       A: I told her that I wanted to talk to her about Mr. 
       Brown taking my kid to his house, that there's no 
       reason for him to take him to his house and give him 
       money to lift him up and down. She told me that she 
       was too busy to listen to me at that time. She told me 
       to talk to Mr. Vecchio [the guidance counselor]. 
 
* * * 
 
       Q: Did you talk to Mr. Vecchio? 
 
       A: Yes. . . . I told him -- she told me to go to him, so 
       I went to him. He said what was the problem. I told 
       him that I wanted to talk to him about Mr. Brown 
       taking my kid to his house and lifting him up and 
       down and giving him money. There was no reason for 
       that. 
 
       Q: Mrs. Sepulveda, did she stay at the office? 
 
       A: No, she walked out. 
 
Appendix at 129-30. 
 
Mercado testified that Vecchio said he was going to talk 
to Brown and "get back to me," but Mercado never heard 
anything further from Vecchio, Sepulveda, or anyone else at 
the school. According to Mercado, Sepulveda appeared to 
be in a hurry, and upset about something when he tried to 
speak to her. He testified: "I couldn't describe it to the lady 
because she was too much in a hurry. She was going out." 
Id. at 139-40. Vecchio and Sepulveda also testified, but 
they both denied having any such conversation with 
Mercado. 
 
Plaintiff also introduced the testimony of Dr. Susan 
Kraus, an expert in psychology and sexual abuse of 
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children. She testified that the "shoulders" game that 
Robert described was actually a masturbatory exercise 
engaged in for sexual gratification. According to her 
testimony, "games" such as this are nothing more than 
sexual activity. They did not constitute anything that could 
be regarded as "horseplay." 
 
Dr. Chester Kent also testified for plaintiff over the 
defendants' objection. Kent was an expert in the field of 
school policy, procedure and administration, with a 
subspecialty in cases involving molestation or abuse of 
children. He opined that the Dr. Sepulveda's internal 
policies for student safety were highly deficient and not 
conducive to protecting the health, safety, or welfare of the 
students at the school. App. 231, 239, 243, 250-1. He also 
surmised that, given the number of children that had been 
victimized by Brown, the level of activity in Brown's 
classroom should have aroused suspicion. He added that 
Sepulveda was complacent and her approach to protecting 
the welfare of the children at her school conveyed that 
complacency to the teachers she was responsible for 
supervising. According to him, those teachers "were 
certainly incapable of recognizing the signs that they 
should have recognized when something was not right 
regarding molestation of students." App. 250-1. Kent 
concluded that Sepulveda's attitude evidenced deliberate 
indifference as exemplified by her response to the Mercado 
complaint. Id. He testified: 
 
       throughout [Sepulveda's] tenure, beginning with the 
       Mercado incident, she basically conducted no 
       investigations of any type to determine if there was a 
       legitimate complaint involved. This becomes very, very 
       important because one could always say, I've turned it 
       over to the police or I turned it over to Children and 
       Youth Services. but the police standard is much 
       higher. . . . School Districts are required to conduct an 
       investigation to determine whether or not a person is 
       fit to be a teacher. None of that has ever gone on under 
       her leadership in the building 
 
App. 251-2. Later in his testimony, Dr. Kent told the jury 
that Dr. Sepulveda's attitude "really served to create a 
hostile environment in the building where young boys. . . 
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became prey of a teacher who was bent on molesting them 
and this was happening right under the nose of the 
principal." App. 257. 
 
Plaintiff also introduced two "supervisory conference" 
memoranda over defense objection. The first memorandum, 
dated 1969, was a two-page evaluation of Brown that had 
been prepared years before he came to Robert's school. The 
memorandum summarized the conference Brown 
apparently had with a supervisor back in 1969. It stated in 
part: "[w]e also discussed his preparation for graduate 
school-- children in his class-- and his involvement with 
children after school hours." Warren v. Reading School 
Dist., 82 F. Supp. 2d 395, 398 (E.D. Pa. 2000). The 
memorandum was in Brown's personnel file in the School 
District Administration Building, but there was no evidence 
that Sepulveda, or anyone else at Robert's school ever saw 
it or knew it existed. 
 
The second memorandum was a supervisory conference 
memorandum that Sepulveda prepared in 1995. It stated in 
part: "it has been brought to my attention that the games 
you play with the students in the classroom involve 
physical contact. For the best interest of all concerned, this 
situation must `stop'." Id. Sepulveda explained that this 
second memorandum referred to a parent's complaint that 
inappropriate "horseplay" was occurring in Brown's 
classroom during recess and not inappropriate sexual or 
physical contact. 
 
At the close of plaintiff 's case, the school district moved 
for judgment as a matter of law under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50. 
The school district argued that plaintiff had not introduced 
sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to conclude 
that an official of the Reading School District had actual 
knowledge of, and was deliberately indifferent to, Brown's 
conduct as was required under the standard recently 
articulated in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School 
District, 524 U.S. 274 (1998). Sepulveda also moved for 
judgment as a matter of law arguing that the evidence was 
insufficient to impose S 1983 liability on her under 
Stoneking v. Bradford Area School District, 882 F.2d 720 (3d 
Cir. 1989). The court denied both motions, and the jury 
returned a verdict against the school district under Title IX 
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in the amount of $400,000. The jury's interrogatories 
established that the jury found that a school district official 
with authority to institute corrective measures had actual 
notice of Brown's conduct and acted with deliberate 
indifference. However, the jury also found for principal 
Sepulveda and concluded that she was not individually 
liable under S 1983. 
 
The school district filed timely motions for judgment as a 
matter or law, or in the alternative, for a new trial, under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b) and 59. The district court denied both 
motions, entered judgment against the school district, and 
awarded plaintiff $104,000 in attorney's fees under 42 
U.S.C. S 1988. This appeal followed. 
 
The school district raises several claims of error. 
However, we will limit our discussion to the district's claim 
that the court erred in not instructing the jury that Vecchio 
could not be considered "an appropriate person" under Title 
IX. Inasmuch as we conclude that the school district is 
entitled to a new trial on that basis, the remaining claims 
of error are moot.2 
 
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
The district court had subject matter jurisdiction over 
plaintiff 's federal claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C.S 1331. We 
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. Our review of the 
district court's denial of the Rule 50(b) motion is plenary. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. We do, however, note our concern with admitting the 1969 conference 
memorandum as this may become an issue at any subsequent retrial. 
The district court concluded that the memorandum"was not unfairly 
prejudicial," and allowed it into evidence. Warren 82 F. Supp. 2d at 401. 
We do not disagree with the court's assessment of the note's minimal 
potential for prejudice. However, its contents are so nebulous that only 
the rankest kind of speculation can connect it to anything relevant to 
Title IX. See P.H. v. School District of Kansas City, 265 F.3d 653, 660 
(8th Cir. 2001) (an "isolated complaint that was nearly 20 years old at 
the time of [the] abusive conduct . . ." was not "itself a sufficient 
basis 
on which to infer that the [defendant school district] had notice of the 
improper sexual contact . . ."). Furthermore, the memorandum is 
unsigned, the author uncertain, and the record is silent as to who 
attended the conference from which it allegedly emanated. 
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Accordingly, we will reverse "only if, viewing the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the nonmovant and giving it the 
advantage of every fair and reasonable inference, there is 
insufficient evidence from which a jury reasonably could 
find liability." Fultz v. Dunn, 165 F.3d 215, 218 (3d Cir. 
1998). We review the district court's order denying a new 
trial for abuse of discretion, unless the court's decision is 
based upon the application of a legal precept. If that is the 
case, our review is plenary. Pryer v. C.O. 3 Slavic, 251 F.3d 




A. LIABILITY UNDER TITLE IX, 20 U.S.C. S 1681 et 
seq. 
 
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 provides 
in pertinent part: 
 
       No person . . . shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded 
       from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be 
       subjected to discrimination under any education 
       program or activity receiving Federal financial 
       assistance. 
 
20 U.S.C. S 1681(a). Although Congress only provided for 
administrative enforcement of Title IX's prohibition against 
discrimination, the Supreme Court held in Cannon v. 
University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979), that Title IX is 
also enforceable through an implied private right of action. 
Thereafter, in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 
503 U.S. 60 (1992), the Court held that monetary damages 
can be recovered in a private action under Title IX. 
However, the Court did not define the parameters of that 
liability until it decided Gebser, supra. 
 
Gebser concerned an implied private cause of action for 
damages resulting from sexual harassment of a student by 
a teacher. Waldrop, who was the teacher, began making 
"sexually suggestive comments to students," and eventually 
initiated sexual contact with the minor plaintiff while 
visiting her home "ostensibly to give her a book" while her 
parents were away. Id. at 277-8. Waldrop's advances 
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escalated to a sexual relationship which he maintained with 
the plaintiff student who was assigned to his classroom. 
 
Gebser never reported Waldrop's conduct. Parents of two 
other students did complain to the high school principal. 
However, those parents only knew of Waldrop's improper 
class room comments, and that was the substance of their 
complaints to the school principal. The principal responded 
by arranging a meeting between himself, the parents who 
had complained, and Waldrop. During that meeting, 
Waldrop stated that he did not believe any of his remarks 
were offensive, but he nevertheless apologized for them. The 
principal responded by cautioning Waldrop about his class 
comments, and later informing the school's guidance 
counselor about the meeting. However, the principal did not 
inform the district superintendent (who was also the 
district's Title IX coordinator) about the meeting. 
 
Waldrop's relationship with Gebser was discovered a 
couple of months later when police encountered them 
having sexual intercourse. They arrested Waldrop, and the 
school district immediately terminated him. Thereafter, 
Gebser's parents brought an action against the school 
district that included a claim under Title IX, and 42 U.S.C. 
S 1983. The district court rejected the Title IX claim 
because it concluded that Title IX did not support liability 
in the absence of a policy, custom or a course of conduct 
that amounted to a custom or policy allowing 
discrimination or harassment. The court reasoned that 
plaintiff had to show actual knowledge of discrimination, 
and a failure to respond in good faith to establish such a 
policy. 524 U.S. at 279. Inasmuch as the evidence 
established that the school district only knew of parents' 
complaints about Waldrop's improper comments, the court 
held that the evidence was not sufficient to establish actual 
or constructive knowledge of a sexual relationship with 
Gebser. Accordingly, the court awarded judgment in favor 
of the defendant school district on the Title IX claim, and 
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. Doe v. 
Lago Vista Independent School Dist., 106 F.3d 1223 (1997). 
 
On appeal, the Supreme Court was asked to decide 
"when a school district may be held liable in damages in an 
implied right of action under Title IX." 524 U.S. at 277. The 
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Court rejected employer liability based upon principles of 
agency that apply in suits for sexual harassment under 
Title VII. The Court reasoned that "it would frustrate the 
purpose of Title IX to permit monetary damages for a 
teacher's sexual harassment of a student based on 
principles of respondent superior or constructive notice." 
Gebser, 524 U.S. at 285, citing Franklin,  503 U.S. at 71. 
Instead, the Court concluded that Title IX's "express 
remedial scheme is predicated upon notice to an 
appropriate person and an opportunity to rectify violation." 
Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
The Court explained that liability in damages could not 
attach under Title IX unless an "appropriate person" had 
actual notice of the conduct that liability is premised upon, 
and explained that: 
 
       [a]n "appropriate person" under [Title IX] is, at a 
       minimum, an official of the recipient entity with 
       authority to take corrective action to end the 
       discrimination. Consequently, in cases like this one 
       that do not involve official policy of the recipient entity, 
       we hold that a damages remedy will not lie under Title 
       IX unless an official who at a minimum has authority 
       to address the alleged discrimination and to institute 
       corrective measures on the recipient's behalf has actual 
       knowledge of discrimination in the recipient's programs 
       and fails adequately to respond. 
 
Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290. 
 
Although the Court did not explicitly state whether a 
school principal can be an "official" or "appropriate person" 
under Title IX, we think it is obvious from the Court's 
discussion that knowledge of a principal can be sufficient in 
an appropriate case. The only official with information 
about the teacher's misconduct in Gebser was the 
principal. The Court examined his actual knowledge and 
concluded that it was not sufficient for liability under Title 
IX. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 291-92. The Court noted that 
 
       [t]he only official alleged to have had information about 
       Waldrop's misconduct is the high school principal. 
       That information, however, consisted of a complaint 
       from parents of other students charging only that 
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       Waldrop had made inappropriate comments during 
       class, which was plainly insufficient to alert the 
       principal to the possibility that Waldrop was involved 
       in a sexual relationship with a student. 
 
524 U.S. at 291. The Court's analysis suggested the 
possibility that the principal could be "an appropriate 
person" under Title IX if plaintiff could establish the 
principal actually knew about the conduct and was 
deliberately indifferent towards it. 
 
The Court's analysis in Gebser rested upon the 
supposition that a principal is usually high enough up the 
bureaucratic ladder to justify basing Title IX liability on his 
or her actual knowledge and deliberate indifference. If a 
principal is not an "appropriate person" for purposes of 
Title IX, a substantial portion of the Supreme Court's 
analysis in Gebser was nothing more than a meaningless 
discussion. See also Davis Monroe County Bd of Educ., 526 
U.S. 629 (1999) (holding that principal's actual knowledge 
and failure to respond would support liability under Title 
IX); and Murrell v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo, 186 F.3d 
1238, 1247 (10th Cir. 1999) ("We find little room to doubt 
that the highest-ranking administrator [at the school] 
exercised substantial control of Mr. Doe and the school 
environment during school hours, and so her knowledge 
may be charged to the School District."). 
 
Moreover, the practical result of holding that a principal 
is not an "appropriate person" would require a plaintiff to 
prove that members of the school's governing body, perhaps 
even a voting majority of those members, knew of the 
improper conduct. That would undermine the private cause 
of action under Title IX that the Court found in Cannon, 
and eliminate the protection Congress intended for 
students in schools receiving Title IX funds. 
 
In concluding that the private cause of action under Title 
IX was not identical to the cause of action under Title VII, 
the Court in Gebser stressed the different purposes of those 
two statutes. The explicit cause of action in Title VII is 
intended to punish acts of discrimination, whereas the 
cause of action in Title IX is intended as protection for the 
student. See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 287 ("Title IX focuses 
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more on `protecting' individuals from discriminatory 
practices carried out by recipients of federal funds."). The 
Court was therefore concerned that an implied right of 
private action not interfere with the opportunities for 
voluntary compliance built into the statutory scheme of 
Title IX, and administrative remedies that Congress 
included in the statutory scheme. Holding a school district 
responsible for actions of a principal fixes responsibility at 
sufficiently high level to afford the recipient of Title IX funds 
an opportunity to respond to claims of discrimination 
before funds are jeopardized by a teacher's conduct. It also 
affords an opportunity for voluntary compliance with the 
contractual undertakings that are part of Title IX funding. 
Gebser, 524 U.S. at 288. ("Presumably, a central purpose of 
requiring notice of the violation `to the appropriate person' 
and an opportunity for voluntary compliance before 
administrative enforcement proceedings can commence is 
to avoid diverting education funding from beneficial uses 
where a recipient was unaware of discrimination in its 
programs and is willing to institute corrective measures."). 
 
The Supreme Court in Gebser recognized the practical 
problems confronting plaintiffs attempting to establish a 
valid claim under Title IX, as well as the increasing 
difficulty of providing educational benefits in the face of 
growing claims of sexual harassment. The Court noted: 
 
       The number of reported cases involving sexual 
       harassment of students in schools confirms that 
       harassment unfortunately is an all too common aspect 
       of the educational experience. No one questions that a 
       student suffers extraordinary harm when subjected to 
       sexual harassment and abuse by a teacher, and that 
       the teacher's conduct is reprehensible and undermines 
       the basic purposes of the educational system. The 
       issue in this case, however, is whether the independent 
       misconduct of a teacher is attributable to the school 
       district that employs him under a specific federal 
       statute designed primarily to prevent recipients of 
       federal financial assistance from using the funds in a 
       discriminatory manner. . . . [W]e will not hold a school 
       district liable in damages under Title IX for a teacher's 
       sexual harassment of a student absent actual notice 
       and deliberate 293 indifference. . . . 
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524 U.S. at 292. 
 
The school district argues that since Gebser did not 
specifically "identify by job title those officials whose actual 
knowledge of a teacher's misconduct may be imputed to the 
school district," there remains an incomplete and vague 
standard as to who may qualify as an "appropriate person," 
and the question remains subject to interpretation. 
Appellants' Br. at 26. We disagree. For the reasons we have 
just discussed, we think that a school principal who is 
entrusted with the responsibility and authority normally 
associated with that position will ordinarily be"an 
appropriate person" under Title IX.3  
 
Having reached that conclusion, however, we must still 
determine if the evidence here was sufficient to allow a 
reasonable jury to conclude that "an appropriate person" 
had actual knowledge of Brown's abuse of Robert. If we 
conclude that it was, we must then determine if the 
evidence allowed the jury to conclude that the "appropriate 
person" exhibited the deliberate indifference necessary to 
liability under Title IX. 
 
B. PLAINTIFF ESTABLISHED ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE 
OF "AN APPROPRIATE PERSON." 
 
Plaintiff attempted to prove that both Sepulveda and 
Vecchio knew of Brown's conduct and the district court 
accepted the argument that each was "an appropriate 
person" under Title IX. On appeal, the school district 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The court in Miller v. Kentosh 1998 WL 355520 (E.D. Pa.) referred to 
the school principal as an appropriate supervisory official for the 
purposes of Title IX liability. Moreover, in Massey v. Akron City Board of 
Education, 82 F.Supp. 2d 735, 744 (N.D. Ohio 2000), the district court 
found that the school principal, who was the supervisor of a teacher who 
allegedly sexually harassed multiple students, was an official who had 
the authority to institute corrective measures against the teacher. 
Similarly, in Canty v. Old Rochester Regional School District, 66 
F.Supp.2d 114 (D. Mass. 1999), summary judgment was dismissed in a 
case where the building principal, deemed an appropriate person under 
Gebser, failed to remedy the misconduct when he admittedly had 
knowledge of it. 
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argues that neither is "an appropriate person," and plaintiff 
persists in arguing that they both are. 
 
The district court concluded that Sepulveda was"an 
appropriate person" and that she transferred her authority 
to Vecchio. The court also concluded that even if Vecchio 
was not "an appropriate person," plaintiff is not entitled to 
a new trial because the weight of the evidence established 
liability based only upon Sepulveda's authority. Warren v. 
Reading School Dist., 82 F. Supp. 2d 395, 401 (E.D. Pa. 
2000). Although we agree that the evidence was sufficient 
to allow a reasonable jury to conclude that Sepulveda was 
"an appropriate person" under Title IX, we do not agree that 
Vecchio was, or that Sepulveda somehow transferred her 
authority to Vecchio. 
 
Dr. Sepulveda testified that she had a doctorate degree in 
education administration and supervision. App. 414. She 
also testified that, as principal, she was in charge of every 
aspect of the daily operations of the Tenth and Green 
Elementary School, including supervision and discipline of 
the teachers at the school. Id. at 414-17. She was 
responsible for the health, safety, and welfare of the 
students at her school. Id. She testified that she enacted, 
oversaw, and administered numerous school programs 
including the latch-key program, migrant program, 
detention program, homework program, and dismissal 
program. Id. She had also been responsible for planning 
agendas for faculty-wide meetings during which she 
instructed teachers on various district policies including 
sexual harassment. Her duties included administrative 
responsibility for educating teachers about sexual 
harassment policies. Id. at 426-28, 442. Her responsibilities 
for supervising teachers obviously included the kind of 
reprimand contained in the supervisory conference note 
mentioned above wherein she rebuked Harold Brown for his 
activities with children. As noted above, that note stated in 
part: "it has been brought to my attention that games that 
you play with students in the classroom involve physical 
contact. For the best interest of all concerned, this situation 
must `stop.' " App. 249 (emphasis added). 
 
Moreover, Dr. Kent's testimony stressed the importance 
of the wording of that note. He believed it was very 
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uncommon for a principal to write such a pointed note and 
place it in a personnel file. Kent opined that it meant that 
Sepulveda was trying to "send a very strong message. They 
did not want this behavior to continue." App. 250. The date 
of this note, October 24, 1995, is after Brown's last contact 
with Robert, and only 10 days before Brown was 
suspended. Therefore, it did not conclusively establish 
Sepulveda's knowledge of Brown's conduct. Moreover, 
Sepulveda explained that the note was written in response 
to parental complaints about "horseplay" in Brown's room 
during recess, and not about the "shoulders" activity, or 
anything like it. See Warren v. Reading School Dist., 82 
F.Supp. 2d at 398. Assuming arguendo that the jury 
accepted that explanation, the note is still highly probative 
of Sepulveda's authority in the school.4  It certainly 
corroborated the plaintiff 's contention that she was "an 
appropriate person" with "authority to institute corrective 
measures on the district's behalf." Gebser , 526 U.S. at 277. 
 
The district court held that Sepulveda had supervisory 
authority "to institute corrective measures on the district's 
behalf," within the meaning of Gebser. 82 F. Supp. 2d at 
400. Although Sepulveda, might not have authority to 
terminate or even suspend a teacher under Pennsylvania 
law, she acknowledges that she had authority to investigate 
a teacher's misconduct. The authority to supervise a 
teacher and to investigate a complaint of misconduct 
implies the authority to initiate corrective measures such 
as reporting her findings to her superior or to the 
appropriate school board official at the very least. We 
therefore agree with the district court that Dr. Sepulveda is 
an official with authority to institute corrective measures on 
the School District's behalf. Moreover, the October 24 
memorandum is certainly consistent with the kind of 
authority necessary to finding that she was "an appropriate 
person" under Gebser.  
 
We also agree that the evidence would support a finding 
that Sepulveda knew of Brown's conduct and was 
deliberately indifferent to it. Mercado's testimony alone 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Although this assumption is contrary to our standard of review, it 
illustrates the force of plaintiff 's evidence. 
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would support a jury finding that Sepulveda had been told 
that a teacher in her elementary school was taking a 
student to that teacher's home, and paying the student to 
engage in physical activity consisting of "lifting up and 
down." She responded by telling Mercado that she was "too 
busy" to listen to this parent's complaint, or act upon it. 
She referred Mercado to Vecchio, a guidance counselor. The 
jury could find deliberate indifference from that testimony 
alone, even absent Kent's expert assessment of it. 5 
 
However, as noted above, plaintiff also argues that the 
evidence would allow the jury to conclude that Vecchio was 
"an appropriate person" as well. Vecchio testified that his 
job involved dealing with children who have behavioral as 
well as academic problems, and referrals to networks of 
agencies that provide assistance to children and families. 
App. 401. He also handled referrals for abuse, and 
assumed the role of principal when Sepulveda was not in 
the building. However, when Mercado visited Tenth and 
Green Elementary School to complain about Brown's 
conduct Sepulveda was present. Nothing suggests that 
Vecchio was acting as principal then except for the 
argument that arises from Sepulveda referring Mercado to 
Vecchio because she was "too busy" to listen. That is not 
sufficient on this record to visit liability upon the school 
district. Although a principal can be "an appropriate 
person," there is clearly insufficient evidence on this record 
to allow a jury to conclude that Vecchio was cloaked with 
sufficient authority to be a "responsible person" during any 
time relevant here. 
 
The case was submitted to the jury under a theory that 
allowed it to find that either Sepulveda or Vecchio was "an 
appropriate person." Moreover, during jury deliberations, 
the jury asked whether the guidance counselor was"an 
appropriate person." The court rejected the school district's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. We realize that Mercado testified that Sepulveda was in a hurry and 
appeared distracted when he spoke to her. However, that is not 
inconsistent with deliberate indifference. Rather, testimony that a school 
principal was too busy to respond to a parent's report that a teacher was 
taking a student to that teacher's home and paying him for some kind 
of physical activity involving "lifting up and down" could only have 
confirmed Sepulveda's indifference. 
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request that the jury be instructed that Vecchio was not 
"an appropriate person" as a matter of law. Rather, the 
court concluded that Vecchio's status under Gebser was a 
fact question, and instructed the jury that it should make 
its own determination based upon the evidence. App. 616- 
618. The school district argues that was error that entitles 
it to a new trial. We agree. 
 
The court's response to the jury allowed the jury to 
return a verdict for plaintiff based upon Vecchio's 
knowledge and deliberate indifference rather than 
Sepulveda's. However, the district court's own opinion 
strongly suggests that the court did not believe that the 
plaintiff 's Title IX claim could be based upon Vecchio's 
knowledge and indifference. The court's entire discussion of 
the jury's concern with Vecchio being "an appropriate 
person" is as follows: 
 
       Defendant next argues that the Court erred when it 
       declined to instruct the jury that Mr. Vecchio, a 
       guidance counselor, was not an "official" of the Reading 
       School District within the meaning of Gebser,  The 
       Court does not agree with Defendant that it is clear 
       that Mr. Vecchio was not an appropriate official under 
       Gebser when the principal, Dr. Sepulveda, had 
       transferred her authority to Mr. Vecchio. But more 
       importantly, even if Mr. Vecchio were not an 
       appropriate official under Gebser, for the reasons 
       discussed in Section One (I) above the jury's verdict 
       would not be "contrary to the great weight of the 
       evidence," nor would the jury's verdict "produce a 
       result inconsistent with substantial justice." Therefore, 
       Defendant's request for a new trial on this basis is 
       denied. 
 
82 F. Supp. 2d at 401 (internal citations omitted). 6 The 
court is careful to note that the school district could be 
liable based upon Vecchio's knowledge "when the principal 
. . . had transferred her authority to" him. Besides, such 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Section one of the opinion, which the court refers to, is the portion 
of 
the court's analysis where the court convincingly discusses why 
Sepulveda's authority would support the school district's liability under 
Title IX. 
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authority could not have been transferred to Vecchio 
without school district approval, and there is none here. 
However, as we have already noted, this record does not 
support a finding that such authority was transferred 
(insofar as Title IX's "appropriate person" limitation is 
concerned) at any time relevant to this complaint. 
Sepulveda merely referred a complaint, she did not delegate 
authority or responsibility. Accordingly, we conclude that 
the district court erred in failing to instruct the jury that 
Vecchio could not be "an appropriate person" on this 
record. 
 
Inasmuch as the jury's verdict slip does not allow us to 
determine if the verdict was based upon Vecchio's actual 
knowledge and deliberate indifference, or Sepulveda's 
actual knowledge and deliberate indifference, we must 
remand for a new trial on plaintiff 's Title IX claim as the 




For the above reasons, we will affirm the district court's 
denial of the defendants' motion for judgment as a matter 
of law, but we will reverse the district court's denial of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The school district argues that the jury's verdict for Sepulveda on the 
S 1983 claim establishes that the jury found that Vecchio, and not 
Sepulveda, was deliberately indifferent under Title IX. Appellant's Br. at 
38. Accordingly, the school district argues it is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law on the Title IX claim. We do not think it appropriate to 
grant judgment as a matter of law, however, because the evidence 
supports a jury verdict on that claim if the verdict is based upon 
Sepulveda's authority, knowledge, and deliberate indifference. The school 
district requests a new trial on the Title IX claim in the alternative, 
and 
that relief is appropriate. 
 
As noted above, plaintiff argues only that both  Vecchio and Sepulveda 
were "appropriate person[s]" for purposes of Title IX. He does not rely 
upon a possibly inconsistent verdict to argue that he should receive a 
new trial on the S 1983 if we order a new trial under Title IX. 
Accordingly, we need not discuss whether the apparent inconsistency in 
the verdicts could justify ordering a new trial on both claims as is 
sometimes proper under our the analysis in Mosley v. Wilson, 102 F.3d 
85, 89-91 (3d Cir. 1996). 
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defendants' motion for a new trial and remand this matter 
to the district court for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion.8 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 




8. In light of our holding, we will instruct the district court to vacate 
its 
award of attorney's fees for plaintiff. See Baumgartner v. Harrisburg 
Housing Authority, 21 F. 3d 541, 544 (3rd Cir. 1994) (In order to receive 
an award of attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. S 1988 "a plaintiff must 
receive at least some relief on the merits of his[/her] claim before 
he[/she] can be said to prevail."). 
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